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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
RECENT CASES
NEGLIGENCE - OPERATION OF STREETCAR - EVIDENCE SUF-
FICIENT TO WARRANT INFERENCE OF NEGLIGENCE -
UNUSUAL CHARACTER OF JERK OR JOLT
Plaintiff boarded a streetcar during the late afternoon rush hour. She was
forced to stand in the rear part of the crowded car and to support herself by hold-
ing on to the cross seats. The car approached an intersection where the inbound
and outbound tracks merged to become one track, the single track forming a sharp
left turn. There was evidence that it was the usual practice for streetcars to proceed
at five miles per hour over the switch and up the single track to the curve, but that
this time the operator drove over the switch at twenty-five miles per hour, causing
the plaintiff to lose her balance, and before she could recover it the car came to
"a sudden stop with a terrible jerk." She was thrown against an upright bar and
sustained injuries to her back and shoulder. The severe, sudden stop threw every-
body in the car. In an action of trespass for personal injuries, the trial court sent
the case to the jury and the plaintiff recovered. Held: Though proof of the sud-
den stop and its effect on the passengers was not of itself sufficient, the plaintiff
met the burden of proving that the operation of the car was so unusual and the
rate of speed so excessive as to warrant the inference of negligence. Whether
twenty-five miles an hour was inconsistent with the exercise of due care was a jury
question. Affirmed. Three judges dissented. TUCKER ET VIR v. PITTSBURGH
RAILWAYS CO., 153 Pa. Super. 63, 33 A. 2d 441 (July 16, 1943).
In reaching this decision, the Superior Court did not purport to overrule any
of its precedents, although recovery is denied in many cases that are superficially
similar on their facts. The question involved is whether there is sufficient evi-
dence of negligence to send the case to the jury, for sending the case to the jury
almost invariably spells recovery. An early case held that the jury could draw an
inference of negligence from testimony to the effect that the jerk was unusual and
violent and that the plaintiff was jarred much more than he had ever been before.
GOODHART v. COLUMBIA & MONTOUR ELECTRIC RAILWAY CO., 36
Pa. Super. 441 (1908). Mere testimony of the unusual character of the jerk or
jolt is no longer sufficient. Such testimony must be accompanied by evidence es-
tablishing that the jerk or jolt was of an unusual or extraordinary character or
evidence of its effect on other passengers sufficient to show this. SMITH ET UX.
v. PITTSBURGH RAILWAYS CO. ,314 Pa. 541 (1934). ENDICOTT v.
PHILA. RAPID TRANSIT CO., 318 Pa. 12 (1935). CUTLER v. PHILA.
RAPID TRANSIT CO., 319 Pa. 351 (1935). ISZARD ET UX. v. PHILA
RAPID TRANSIT CO., 100 Pa. Super. 242 (1930). It is not enough to show
that the plaintiff was injured and that the other passengers were jolted or jarred.
There must be some other evidence to prove that the operator was negligent and
that the jerk was unusual.
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The unusual character of the jerk or jolt may be shown by 1) the unusual
character of the fall, 2) an occurrence outside the car, or 3) other direct evidence,
such as excessive speed. Thus in BLISS v. PHILA. RAPID TRANSIT CO., 73
Pa. Super. 173 (1919), the plaintiff was rendered unconscious by falling from
the car, and it was held that this was sufficient evidence to send the case to the
jury. In DiPAOLO ET UX. v. PHILA. RAPID TRANSIT CO., 101 Pa. Super.
254 (1930), three or four passengers fell on the plaintiff when a sudden stop was
made. And in SANSON v. PHILA. RAPID TRANSIT CO., 239 Pa. 505 (1913),
the plaintiff was thrown out upon the platform and into the street. In these cases
the effect of the jerk upon the plaintiff itself establisbed the extraordinary character
of the jerk, and the plaintiff recovered. The evidence has been held to be insuf-
ficient when the plaintiff simply fell to the floor of the car: McCLUSKEY v.
SHENANGO VAL. TRACTION CO., 105 Pa. Super. 275 (1932). Also when
the plaintiff fell to her knees: COOK v. PHILA. RAPID TRANSIT CO., 120 Pa.
Super. 565 (1936). In these cases the character of the fall was held not enough
to prove the jerk to be unusual. Nor is testimony of the attending physician that the
"injury must have been caused by a terrific force" evidence that the accident was
unusual and sufficient to enable the jury to find negligence on the part of the
motorman. HAWKINS v. PITTSBURGH RAILWAYS CO., 146 Pa. Super.
185 (1941). MONAHAN ET VIR v. PITTSBURGH RAILWAYS CO., 149
Pa. Super. 283 (1942).
An occurence outside the car may establish the unusual character of the jerk,
although it may not be sufficient to prove the operator negligent. "If a sudden and
violent stop was made necessary by something which occurred outside the car, and
which was beyond the control of the motorman, and in his judgment made it
needful to stop abruptly . . . . that fact should have been made to appear:"
TILTON v. PHILA. RAPID TRANSIT CO., 231 Pa. 63. In DiPAOLO ET UX.
v. PHILA. RAPID TRANSIT CO., 101 Pa. Super. 254 (1930), the sudden,
violent stop in the middle of the block was made to avoid a collision with a truck,
and the motorman's explanation of the stop was not sufficient to take the case from
the jury. In COOK v. PHILA. RAPID TRANSIT CO., 120 Pa. Super. 565
(1936), the motorman stopped suddenly when he heard a scraping and crashing
sound along side the car, caused by one auto's colliding with another auto and
throwing it against the trolley. It was held that the case should not have gone to
the jury because there was a sufficient explanation of the stop. Again, there was
sufficient evidence to take the case to the jury where it was shown that the motor-
man stopped the car suddenly to avoid a head-on collision: DRESS v. SCHUYL-
KILL RAILWAYS CO., 83 Pa. Super. 149 (1924).
In the instant case, the plaintiff proved that the "sudden stop with a terrible
jerk" was unusual and out of the ordinary by showing that the car went over the
switch at twenty-five miles per l/our, while the usual practice was for cars to pro-
ceed over it at five miles per hour. "The plaintiff produced evidence that was direct
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and express, and not merely circumstantial, that the rate of speed was excessive
under the circumstances." Twenty years ago a case went to the jury when the
plaintiff proved that the car went around a curve with "unabated speed," even
though the plaintiff could not give the exact rate of speed. MURPHY v. AL-
TOONA & LOGAN VALLEY ELECTRIC RAILWAY CO., 81 Pa. Super. 504
(1923).
In the light of these cases, it is easy to understand why it was held, in two
fairly recent cases, that there was not sufficient evidence to enable the jury to find
negligence: COYLE v. PITTSBURGH RAILWAYS CO., 149 Pa. Super. 281
(1942), and MONAHAN ET VIR v. PITTSBURGH RAILWAYS CO., 149
Pa. Super. 283 (1942). In both of these cases there was ample evidence of the
plaintiff's injury but there was nothing to show that the "start" or "jolt" was un-
usual. The rule that requires proof that the jolt was of an unusual character is
obviously one of necessity, although it miiy seem harsh at times. With our present
day transportation systems, traffic problems and speed, a certain amount of jerk-
ing and jolting is unavoidable and to be expected. A more lenient rule would
make it impossible for the street railways to operate. See COYLE v. PITTS-
BURGH RAILWAYS CO., 149 Pa. Super. 281 (1942), for discussion 6f rule.
While the rule itself is well settled, the application of the rule, i. e., the determin-
ation of whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant an inference of negligence,
still lies within the discretion of the court. Each case must rest on its own particular
facts, and the decision depends upon the court's evaluation of the evidence. There
is a great deal of room for differences of opinion as to the sufficiency of evidence.
Undoubtedly there are. many border-line cases. Whether or not the courts have




H petitioned the courts of Pennsylvania in two instances for a decree of divorce
and in both instances it was denied. Having failed in this state, H went to Las
Vegas, Nevada, and ther'e was granted a divorce from W on grounds not
recognized by the courts of Pennsylvania. W was not served with process in
Nevada nor did she enter an appearance, although she was served in Pennsylvania.
H then petitioned the Pennsylvania court for the revocation of an order of support
previously made by that court. The petition was dismissed by lower court. On
appeal the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the decree of the Nevada court
was void because H was not actually domiciled in Nevada. Commonwealth v.
Esenwein, 153 Pa. Superior Ct. 69, 33 A2d69.
Domicil is a jurisdictional fact necessary to the extra-territorial validity of a
foreign decree of divorce. The lack of it may be raised in a collateral proceeding.
Colvin v. Reed, 55 Pa. 375; Reel v. Elder, 62 Pa. 308; Fyock's Estate, 135 Pa.
522; Hcins's Estate, 22 Pa. Superior Ct. 31. These cases also hold that a foreign
divorce granted on constructive service only at the domicil of the libellant alone,
will not be (ecognized as a matter of comity in this state.
In setting forth the above principles, the courts of Pennsylvania followed
the precedents enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases
of Bell v. Bell, 21 Sup. Ct. 551, 181US 175, 45L. ed 804 and Haddock v. Had-
dock, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 201US 562, 50L. ed. 867. Bell v. Bell, supra, held that
no valid divorce could be decreed on constructive service by the courts of a state
in which neither party was domiciled. Haddock v. Haddock held that the mere
domicil within the state of one party to the marriage did not give the courts of that
state jurisdiction to render a decree of divorce 'enforceable in all other states by
virtue of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution against a non-
resident who did not appear and was only constructively served with notice of the
pendency of the action. See Radinovitz's Estate, 299 Pa. 264, citing Haddock v.
Haddock.
In Commonwealth v. Cronhardt, 127 Pa. Superior Ct. 501 it was held that
a decree of divorce, although granted upon constructive service only, by the court
of the state which is both the domicil of the libellant and the only matrimonial
domicil of the husband and wife must be accorded full faith and credit when
questioned in another state. This distinction based on matrimonial domicil was
recognized by Haddock v. Haddock as an exception. But the Pennsylvania court
in the Cronhardt case reiterated the holding of several earlier Pennsylvania cases
that the findings of domicil may be attacked in a collateral proceeding. This view
is sustained by the Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 10, (L) where it is said
that a question of domicil as between the state of the forum and another state is to
be determined by the law of the forum.
In 1941, the Superior Court modified tht view expressed in its prior deci-
sions and gave full faith an4 credit to a foreign divorce granted on constructive
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service. Commonwealth v. Custer, 145 Pa. Superior Ct. 535. However it is to be
noted that the court there expressly found that the libellant was domiciled in that
state and on the basis of comity recognized the decree. It is interesting to note
that the court gave as its basis for so doing the Divorce Law of May 2, 1929, P. L.
1237 as amended by the Act of June 10, 1935, P. L. 294, which gave jurisdic-
tion to the courts to grant decrees against non-residents where constructive service
is employed. Similar procedure was used in granting the foreign decree.
In the very widely publicized case of Williams v. North Carolina, 317US
287, 63 Sup. Ct. 207, it was held that if the plaintiff in the divorce proceedings
acquired a bona fide domicil in the state which gave him a divorce, the decree is
entitled to full faith and credit even though the forum granting the divorce was
not the matrimonial domicil. It should be emphasized that although the case ex-
pressly overruled Haddock v. Haddock by holding that it was immaterial that the
non-resident did not appear and was not personally served, still the court gave no
opinion whatsoever as to whether one court must recognize the findings of domicil
by the foreign court granting the decree. The court carefully pointed out that it
was not overruling Bell v. Bell.
It thus can be seen that the present case is not inconsistent with the holding
of Williams v. North Carolina but merely follows what was said many times in
the Pennsylvania cases and by the Supreme Court of the United States. That is,
notwithstanding the fact that domicil was found by the foreign court, the forum
still may make its own findings to determine whether the domicil was bona fide.
The view adopted by the court accords with that taken in the field of taxation.
See Dorrance Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 167 A. 303, New Jersey v. Pennsylvania, 287
US 580; In re Dorrance, 115 N. J. Eq. 268, 170 A. 601, both Pennsylvania and
New Jersey held that deceased was domiciled in their respective jurisdictions and
the United States Supreme Court refused to review either of the cases.
Since the decision in Williams v. North Carolina, supra, with but two excep-
tions, the interpretation given by the Pennsylvania court has been followed in other
jurisdictions. Lambert v. Lambert, 41 NYS 840 and Stephens v. Stephens,
49NE2d 560, 319 ILL. App. 292 refused to go into the question of whether
domicil in the foreign jurisdiction was bona fide but merely adopted the other
court's findings. These cases can not be said to be contra to that of Common-
wealth v. Esenwein, but may be explained on the ground that there is nothing to
prevent the court from giving recognition to the foreign decree if it so desires.
Cases in accord with the Pennsylvania view are Noffsinger v. Noffsinger, 50 Fed.
Sup. 810.; Bowditch v. Bowditch, 50NE2d 65, (Mass.) and In re Bingham's
Estate, 39 NYS2d756 affirming 36NYS584.
Until such a time as a Federal Divorce Law is enacted, it would seem that each
state should have it within its power to determine the marital status of its citizens
and not be obliged to bow to the policy of another state.
JOHN SCHATT
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NEGLIGENCE - SUPERSEDING CAUSE
Agnes Venorick was injured when an automobile driven by Pendleton struck
and wedged her against the rear of Revetta's truck, which was parked on the high-
way in violation of Sec. 1019 of the Vehicle Code (Act of 1929, May 1, P. L. 905
as amended, 75 P. S. 611). Verdict and judgment were rendered against both
defendants, and Revetta appealed from the refusal of his motion for judgment
n. o. v. Held: because Pendleton's act of negligence was a "superseding" cause of
the injury, judgment against Revetta reversed and entered for him. Venorick v.
Revetta et al, 152 Pa. Super. 455 (1943).
The doctrine of "superseding cause" is firmly established in the law of neg-
ligence in Pennsylvania and elsewhere. Gilbert -v. Goralnik, 238 I11. App. 199
(1926); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Cocke, 3 SW 2d 139 (Texas, 1928); Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Portland Gas Light Co., 57 F 2d 801 (Maine, 1932); Gaupin
v. Murphy, 295 Pa. 214 (1928); DeCarlo v. Margolis, 320 Pa. 500 (1936).
On the other hand, there is the equally well established principle of concurrent
negligence, which is illustrated in the case of Hughes v. Pittsburgh Transportation
Co., 300 Pa., 55, 60 (1930): ". . . where there would have been no injury what-
ever but for the continuing negligence of the defendant who first put the plaintiff
in peril, and which existed when the negligence of the other turned the peril into
actual injury, the negligences are concurrent and both defendants are jointly and
severally liable for the injuries thereby occasioned." Restatement of Torts, Sec.
439; Washington & G. R. Co. v. Hickey, 166 U. S. 521 (1897); Burrell Town-
ship v. Uncapher, 117 Pa. 353 (1887); O'Malley v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 248
Pa. 292 (1915); Jaras v. Wright, 263 Pa. 486 (1919); Smith v. Reading Transit
Light Co., 282 Pa. 511 (1925).
But in Pennsylvania the theory has been developed in some cases that the
concurrent negligence rule applies only if the second actor does not become aware
of the peril created by the other wrongdoer till his own negligence plus that of the
other who has already created the dangerous condition, has made the accident in-
evitable, while, on the other hand, if there is an "independent" act of negligence
by the second tort-feasor after awareness of the existing peril, the original neg-
ligence is considered a non-causal factor. This is the theory of all the Pennsylvania
automobile cases similar to the present one, and of a great many cases involving
road defects.
Thus, many cases allow recovery by a passenger in a car which collided with a
vehicle negligently parked on the highway, against the driver of the standing
vehicle, or against him and the negligent driver of the car in which the plaintiff
was a passenger. Cormican v. Menke, 306 Pa. 156 (1932); Harkins v. Somerset
Bus Co., 308 Pa. 109 (1932); Janeway v. Lafferty Bros., 323 Pa. 324 (1936);
Gaber v. Weinberg, 324 Pa. 385 (1936); Meads v. Rutter, 122 Pa. Super. 64
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(1936). These decisions involve the conclusion of law that the negligence of the
driver of the parked car was a proximate cause of the accident, and are based on
the finding of fact that the driver of the moving vehicle through negligence or
otherwise failed to see the standing car in time to prevent the accident. On the
other hand, in Stone v. Phila., 302 Pa. 340 (1931), Hoffman v. McKeesport, 303
Pa. 548 (1931), and Schwartz v. Jaffe, 324 Pa. (1936), parties responsible for
defects in the road were held not liable for injuries suffered partly because of such
defects, where it appeared that the drivers whose negligent acts also contributed
to the injuries, knew of the conditions of the roads, and acted in utter disregard
of them.
In a very recent case, Ashworth v. Hannum et al, 347 Pa. 393 (1943), under
facts almost identical with those of the case under discussion, recovery was denied
against the driver of the parked car, where it was found that it was in full view of
the driver of the moving vehicle for a distance of at least 500 feet, and that there
was thus ample time for tht driver to stop or otherwise take care. The court in
the Ashworth case said that the "unforeseeable conduct" of the second tort-feasor
made the negligence of the first a remote cause of the accident.
Sec. 447 of the Restatement of Torts says that the second negligent act is not
a superseding cause if (a.) the first tort-feasor should have realized at the time
of his negligent act that another might so act, or (b.) if a reasonable man in the
circumstances would not regard it as highly extraordinary that the third party would
so act, or (c.) if the second negligent act is a normal response to the situation, and
the manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily negligent. Under (a.) and
(b.), it is the mental attitude of the first tort-feasor and of the so-called "reason-
able man," respectively, that is made important, not the knowledge of the second
tort-feasor. Nor could we say, under (c.), that awareness of the peril by the second
actor before his negligent act per se renders it not a normal response, and an ex-
traordinarily negligent act. The distinction recognized by the many Pennsylvania
car cases and urged as the basis of the present decision finds no support in the
Restatement.
Some Pennsylvania cases, in fact, fail to hold that awareness on the part of
the second actor should absolve the first: Burrell Township v. Uncapher, supra;
O'Malley v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co., supra; Smith v. Reading Transit & Light
Co., supra. Such a distinction is tenuous. It is difficult to see why a tort-feasor's
liability should be made to depend on the mental state of a subsequent tort-feasor.
But under the foregoing reasoning, in the instant case, Pendleton's act of
negligence was found to be a superseding cause. Assuming Revetta's negligence,-
and the jury having found him guilty of a violation of Sec. 1019 of the Vehicle
Code, he was negligent as a matter of law,-it was not the proximate cause of the
accident because Pendleton saw the truck when he was about 300 feet away from
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it and traveling 20 or 25 miles an hour. Without reducing his speed he attempted
to pass the Revetta truck, saw an approaching vehicle, turned back, applied his
brakes, skidded, and ran into the plaintiff and the truck.
The court said concerning the test of superseding cause in Kline v. Moyer
and Albert, 325 Pa. 357 (1937), at 364: "Where a second actor has become aware
of the existence of a potential danger created by the negligence of an original tort-
feasor, and thereafter, by an independent act of negligence, brings about an acci-
dent, the first tort-feasor is relieved of liability, because the condition created by
him was merely a circumstance of the accident and not its proximate cause."
GLORIA HAGGERTY
